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This paper criticizes the current International Development Association (IDA) aid 
allocation and debt sustainability framework on the grounds of their over-reliance on the 
country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA) as the guiding criterion. It argues 
that CPIA-centred allocation of aid fails to introduce an incentives structure supportive 
of a genuine donor-recipient partnership, conducive to development. Further, it claims 
that the CPIA-dependent debt thresholds—central to the new debt sustainability 
framework—effectively submit sustainability concerns to the policy performance 
prerogatives of the aid allocation system. Resting on a thin empirical basis, such 
approach fails to take due account of low-income countries’ vulnerability to exogenous 
shocks, as a key determinant of debt distress. As an alternative to the current CPIA-
based scheme, the paper outlines the key features of a state-contingent mechanism, 
guiding both aid allocation and debt sustainability analysis.  
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In the early 1980s, there was a radical change in aid delivery structure from project aid 
towards policy-based programme aid. Structural adjustment programmes (SAPs) had 
become a favoured conduit for both multilateral and bilateral aid, with a string of strict 
‘policy’ conditionality instituted. Policy conditionality was justified on the grounds that 
donors should actively influence the policy and conduct of recipient countries through 
‘aid’ leverage. Ex ante conditionality, whereby foreign aid and budget supports were 
delivered conditional upon the promises of implementation of stabilization-cum-
structural reforms, had become a dominant feature in the donor-recipient relationships. 
As Kanbur (2005) notes, ‘conditionality’ itself is nothing more than the rules and 
procedures according to which a donor transfers resources to a recipient. What is 
debated, however, is the nature of conditionality, in particular that of ‘policy’ 
conditionality, which has been practiced to date in one form or another.   
By the mid-1990s, however, despite adding an array of political and economic 
conditionality, the donor community had to face the uneasy reality: ex  ante policy 
conditionality was not effective in tying the recipient governments to the reform agenda 
of donors (e.g., Killick 1996, 1997; Collier 1998; Collier and Dollar 2004). This sparked 
off a new round in the aid-effectiveness debate against the background of declining 
public support for foreign aid in donor countries (World Bank 1998). The poor record of 
compliance and enforcement of policy conditionality was recognized in various 
evaluation reports on World Bank’s adjustment loans (World Bank 2005c).1 
Thus, the efficacy of policy conditionality has been a central question in the 
aid-effectiveness debate over the last decade or so. In the debate, ex  ante policy 
conditionality has been examined largely from a narrow perspective of the moral hazard 
problem, i.e., the problem arising from granting foreign aid without a firm commitment 
on the part of recipient countries to reform programmes. Assessed from this perspective, 
it has been argued that policy conditionality was faulted on incorrect rationales given to 
adjustment lending, since an effective mechanism to deal with the moral hazard 
problem was absent.  
Collier (1998) argues, for example, that none of the three rationales for programme 
lending—namely the use of aid as an incentive for reform, financing the ‘cost of 
adjustment’, and ‘defensive lending’ to service external debt—are soundly based. 
Similarly, Easterly (2003) explains the failure of ex ante conditionality in terms of 
incentive systems affecting donor behaviour. He suggests that despite continuous breach 
of policy conditionality by recipient governments, donor agencies have kept ‘moving 
money’ and ‘pushing loans’ under the constant pressure of improving their own 
performance indicator, assessed in terms of aid disbursements. 
With recognition of the difficulty in overcoming the moral hazard problem ex ante, it 
had been proposed to overhaul the aid allocation rule, so that aid is allocated on an 
ex post policy performance basis. Thus, while ex ante conditionality is ‘incentives-based’ 
aid allocation on promises for policy change, ex post conditionality is claimed to be 
‘selectivity-based’ on retrospective assessments of performance. That is, instead of 
                                                 
1   See Dollar and Svensson (2000); Alesina and Dollar (2000) and Burnside and Dollar (2000) for a 
summary of empirical findings.  
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using conditionality to induce policy change, it is suggested that aid should be used to 
target financial flows on those governments that have already established good policy 
environments (World Bank 1998). Creating star performers by engineering aid 
allocation, Collier (1998) further argues, would induce non-reforming governments to 
change their policies through the pressures of emulation, and would result in enhanced 
overall aid effectiveness. It has been argued that through the ex  post selectivity 
approach, donors can affect growth and poverty reduction through their allocation of aid 
and debt relief.  
Indeed, the aid effectiveness debate has been conducted in parallel with the search for 
lasting debt relief measures to deal with the severe debt overhang conditions found in 
highly indebted poor countries (HIPCs). The donor community launched the HIPC 
Initiative in 1996 and three years later enhanced its scope and depth, as a real and 
durable exit option from the protracted debt crisis for HIPCs.2 Under the HIPC 
Initiative, the process conditionality is instituted as part of formulating the poverty 
reduction strategy papers (PRSP), which is supposed to be a recipient-driven process.3 
The debt sustainability analysis has been routinely integrated into the PRSP process and 
the HIPC debt relief negotiations. Finally, the comprehensive development framework, 
introduced in 1999 in place of structural adjustment programmes, emphasizes the 
importance of ownership and partnership in the aid relationships. It has been heralded 
that a new aid architecture has been built, where a selectivity based aid allocation is 
used ex post policy conditionality and the debt sustainability analysis is integrated into 
the ‘performance-based’ aid allocation process. 
Building on our early work (Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001, 2004), the principal 
objectives of this paper are (i) to assess the analytical and empirical basis of the aid 
allocation currently in operation and the associated debt sustainability analysis 
embedded therein; (ii) to present an alternative framework which could align incentive 
structures better in aid and debt contracts between donors and recipients. Towards these 
objectives, the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 evaluates the CPIA-based 
selectivity approach to aid allocation as ex post policy conditionality in the International 
Development Association (IDA) facility at the World Bank. Section 3 examines the debt 
sustainability analysis embedded in the current IDA facility, which determines the outright 
grant component of the IDA facility. Section 4 presents an alternative aid allocation and 
debt sustainability framework, which has the potential of making aid and debt contracts 
more incentive compatible. Section 5 offers concluding remarks.  
2  The CPIA-based selectivity approach to aid allocation 
as ex post policy conditionality 
The donor-recipient aid relationships are usually examined in the principal-agent 
theoretical model, wherein recipients are agents implementing the conditions desired by 
donors, i.e., the principals (Killick 1996 and 1997). Conditionality is then the means of 
using leverage accorded by ‘aid giving’ to promote donor objectives. As such, it can be 
                                                 
2   See Nissanke and Ferrarini (2001, 2004) for our critical evaluation of the HIPC Initiative. 
3   Mosley, Hudson and Verschoor (2004) propose a new conditionality to tie aid specifically to poverty 
reduction in the form of the pro-poor expenditure (PPE) index in the PRSP process.  
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administered in a co-operative manner between the principals and the agents (Killick 
1996). However, in reality, there are conflicts and congruence between the objectives 
and interests of donors and recipients. In particular, it is often assumed that donors have 
altruistic preferences (e.g., caring about the voiceless poor), whereas recipient 
governments are typically constrained in pursuing such objectives by domestic political 
economy considerations. Furthermore, it is admitted that in the aid relations 
characterized by asymmetric powers, conditions are more likely to be drafted and 
imposed by donors and accepted—usually unwillingly—by recipients (White and 
Morrissey 1997). As a consequence, it is this coercive nature of policy conditionality 
which has largely shaped the donor-recipient relationships over the recent decades. 
This can be best illustrated in the ‘languages’ used to analyse the multiple roles of 
policy conditionality in the aid relationships. For example, Collier and Gunning (1996) 
classify the objectives of policy conditionality into four categories:  
i)  paternalism, where donors believe they know what is best for the recipient;  
ii)  bribery, when donors persuade recipients to implement reforms that are 
otherwise not undertaken; 
iii)  restraints, when donors place conditions to prevent the recipient from policy 
reversal on reforms;  
iv)  signalling to the private sector and other donors that the reform programme is 
sincere.  
From a similar perspective, World Bank (2005c) discusses rationales for conditionality 
in terms of:  
i)  compensation by the donor to the recipient government for adopting the 
policies preferred by the former, when each party has different beliefs on the 
appropriateness of the policy; 
ii)  restraint/counterbalance device for the government in the face of domestic 
opposition to policy reforms; and  
iii)  signalling of commitments to reforms to potential private investors. 
Using the principal-agent framework, Killick (1996, 1997) explains the inherent tension 
engendered by policy conditionality in the aid relationships in terms of: the 
asymmetrical burden of risks between donors and recipient governments; the high short-
term economic and political costs associated with reform measures compared with 
slowly emerging benefits; and the high monitoring and enforcement costs. In particular, 
he notes that the involuntary nature of policy conditionality undermines the legitimacy 
of reforms. Thus, when reform measures are not home-grown, recipient governments try 
to evade commitments and regress when the opportunity arises, as they are supposed to 
bear political risks and adjustment costs. Yet the incentive structures to monitor and 
enforce aid contracts are weak when the donor agencies are prone to ‘pro-lending’ 
ethos, and hence donor commitment to enforce conditionality and sanction is seen not 
credible. Killick concludes that ‘(ex ante) conditionality does not meet its promise of 
greater aid effectiveness … A further cost is that conditionality distorts the nature of the 
discourse between the donors and developing country governments…’ (1997: 493). He 
suggests that a new model of donor-recipient relationships should be based on 
‘selectivity’ along with other principles such as ownership, support and dialogue.   
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In evaluating the efficacy of conditionality when donor and recipient preferences for 
policy reform and aid vary, White and Morrissey (1997) also show that ex ante 
conditionality tends to create conflicts between donors and recipients even when 
recipient governments are sincere about economic reforms. They conclude that 
conditionality is neither an effective mechanism to induce reform on unwilling 
governments, nor an appropriate mechanism for genuine reformers. They suggest that 
the switch to ex post conditionality could reduce such conflicts, if it is solely based on 
performance measures that are truly independent of external shocks or unavoidable 
implementation problems that are beyond the control of recipient governments.  
Consequently, the new aid architecture, as emerging today from the aid effectiveness 
debate, has adopted the selectivity rule as a guiding principle for aid allocation. 
However, it is well-known that the analytical and empirical basis for the selectivity 
approach rests almost entirely on cross-country regression results of the growth-aid 
relationship, such as the study by Burnside and Dollar (1997, 2000). They draw a very 
strong policy conclusion from the significant positive coefficient on the policy-aid 
interaction term in their cross-country regressions. According to these authors, while aid 
generally does not have any significant effect on the rate of economic growth or 
investment, the growth-enhancing effect of aid can be found only in a good policy 
environment.4  
These empirical studies have been severely challenged on technical grounds. For 
example, Easterly, Levin and Roodman (2004) argue that the regression results obtained 
by Burnside and Dollar are not robust as they are extremely sensitive to how the 
included key variables such as aid,  policy and growth are defined and measured. 
Dalgaard and Hansen (2001) question the theoretical underpinning of the Burnside-
Dollar study as well as the sensitivity of their econometric results to the data samples. 
Guillaumont and Chauvet (2001) argue that aid is most effective when it is available to 
countries disadvantaged by large external shocks and climatic conditions. Their cross-
country pooled regressions show that the external environment factor rather than the 
policy environment is a determining factor in improving aid effectiveness.  
Hansen and Tarp (2001a, 2001b) further challenge the validity of the empirical analysis 
by Burnside and Dollar, comparing their results with a large number of past and current 
empirical studies on the aid-growth relationships. They conclude that the difference 
between the results obtained by Burnside and Dollar and others stems mostly from the 
model specification and other technical issues.5 Hence, they caution strongly against 
basing aid allocation rules on the single-cause explanations. Wangwe (2003), assessing 
the three criteria adopted by Burnside and Dollar for defining good policies, i.e., budget 
surplus, inflation and openness, concludes that they are too narrow.  
                                                 
4   They also found that aid is subject to diminishing marginal returns. While Lensink and White (2001) 
agree on the existence of such an aid-Laffer curve, they suggest that this is due to the limited 
absorption capacity of recipient countries in using aid productively, and that the threshold level above 
which aid starts having a negative effect on growth in the Laffer-curve is about 50 per cent of the 
aid/GDP ratio, much higher than the level suggested by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002). 
5   See also Hudson (2004) and Morrissey (2004) for discussions on econometric issues arising from the 
differences in model specification, sample size and estimation methods, adopted in these studies.   
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In recognition that the policy-performance indicators used in the original Burnside-
Dollar study are too limited, the World Bank subsequently presented a more 
comprehensive matrix—country policy and institutional assessment (CPIA)—for 
assessing and ranking countries according to their institutional and policy environment 
for long-term growth and poverty reduction. Using the CPIA as a screening device, 
further studies by Collier and Dollar (2001, 2002 and 2004) reiterate the earlier claims 
by Burnside and Dollar that the aid and policy can interact in such a positive manner for 
economic growth that ‘aid enhances the growth effect of policy and good policy 
increases the growth effect of aid’ (Collier and Dollar 2001: 1788).  
Acknowledging that aid is used by donors for objectives other than accelerating 
economic growth, Collier and Dollar (2001 and 2002) extend their analysis to arrive at a 
poverty-efficient allocation of aid as a benchmark for assessing the performance of 
actual allocation in terms of achieving the poverty reduction objective.6 On the basis of 
similar cross-country regressions, they advocate that aid should be given to countries 
with ‘good’ policy while allowing for the differences in the incidence of poverty to 
arrive at a poverty-efficient allocation as close as possible within the aid-policy 
configuration. The technical basis of their cross-country regression results on aid-
growth-policy trajectory remains rather fragile and unconvincing as the basic thrust of 
their econometric exercises is the same as the original Burnside-Dollar study. Further, 
the use of the CPIA index can be objected on several technical grounds, including its 
endogeneity to the growth process.7 Despite these criticisms, the selectivity rule had a 
strong appeal for the donor community as an effective instrument to overcome the 
moral hazard problems in dealing with recipient governments. 
In particular, their poverty-efficient aid allocation proposal has indeed become 
influential in the policy debate on the feasibility of achieving the Millennium 
Development Goals (MDGs), where the poverty reduction is singled out as the most 
important objective of giving aid and publicized as such in order to mobilize public 
support for securing aid budgets in donor countries.8 On the basis of their simulation 
analysis, it is claimed that the MDG target in poverty reduction is more likely met by a 
combination of more efficient aid allocation, policy reform and more generous aid. 
Their estimates proclaim, for example, that the proposed poverty-efficient aid allocation 
would reduce the number of poor people by an extra 18 million per year compared with 
what can be achieved in the poverty reduction under the allocation practiced hitherto.  
These optimistic predictions have provided the donor community with a basis of 
adopting the CPIA-based allocation for IDA loan disbursement and HIPC debt relief as 
its performance-based allocation system (PBA) at the World Bank since 2002 (IDA-13 
and IDA-14). For example, the aid allocation rule used in IDA-14 is shown in the left 
half of Figure 1. The PBA now uses the CPIA comprising of 16 criteria grouped in four 
                                                 
6   A poverty-efficient allocation of aid is defined as one in which the marginal cost of poverty reduction 
is equalized across recipient countries. Collier and Dollar (2004) discuss aid-allocation rules for 
achieving other donor objectives such as a security -efficient allocation. 
7   Dalgaard, Hansen and Tarp (2004) suggest using instrument such as ‘the fraction of land in tropics’ 
for the CPIA index for the regression analysis, so that the endogeneity problem of the CIPA index is 
dealt with. See discussion below for further critical issues on the construction of the CPIA index.  
8   Their proposal was, for example, used as a guide in US aid allocation of the Millennium Challenge 
Account (Collier and Dollar 2004).   
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equally weighted clusters: (i) economic management; (ii) structural policies; 
(iii)  policies for social inclusion and equity; (iv) public sector management and 
institutions (Appendix Table A1). In IDA-14, the country performance ratings (CPR) is 
arrived at by using the composite index (the CPIA is given 80 per cent, with 20 per cent 
weight allocated to the annual report on portfolio performance (ARPP) for assessing 
Bank’s own project performance). The composite index is further moderated by a 
governance factor (GOV)9 for reaching the final CPR (World Bank 2005a). Only in 
exceptional circumstances is the performance-based country allocation adjusted in light 
of countries’ access to alternative financial sources or their emergence from conflict or 
severe natural disaster.  
The IDA loan allocation to country i, as a share of the total IDA envelope, is determined 
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Clearly, this formula makes the CPIA the dominant factor in the IDA allocation, while 
variables such as population (POP) and gross national income per capita (GNIPC) are 
merely a moderating factor. This is implicitly confirmed by the World Bank, stating that 
‘there is a modest bias in favour of the IDA eligible countries with a lower GNI per 
capita’ (World Bank 2005a-Annex: 4). Thus, as Kanbur (2005: 5) notes, ‘the 
performance rating has a much higher weight than the measure of the need’, where ‘the 
need’ is captured by the income criterion. In short, ‘aid productivity’ is given precedent 
over the ‘need’ in the donor’s impact analysis (ibid. 11).   
In assessing the selectivity aid allocation rule, it is therefore critical to examine how the 
CPIA itself is constructed in relation to a more fundamental question as to who defines 
(and how to define) good policies for country-specific conditions. In particular, it is 
important to note that the CPIA is not an objective measure of the quality of policies and 
institutions, but is a set of subjective scores (1-6 rating scores) by Bank staff, based on 
questionnaires organized with country teams at the World Bank (World Bank 2005b).  
Furthermore, the CPIA is constructed in terms of mixed score parameters: while some 
parameters rank policy choices and institutional quality, others rather reflect outcomes 
or, more often, both outcomes and policy choices. Hence, the World Bank’s assertion 
that policies and institutional arrangements assessed through the questionnaires can be 
classified as input, which are within the country’s control, as opposed to outcome (e.g., 
the growth rate), which is influenced by elements beyond the country’s control, should 
be seriously questioned. In reality, such a separation is often fictitious, as is apparent 
upon a closer inspection of score guidelines listed under each of the CPIA categories 
(World Bank 2005d).  
                                                 
9  The governance factor itself is derived as the average rating of the five criteria constituting cluster D 
of the CPIA (public sector management and institutions), plus the procurement element of the ARPP 
portfolio rating, raised to the power 1.5.   
10  IDA (2005: Attachement II).  
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Many indicators can be seen as reflecting outcomes influenced by exogenous events. 
For example, the ability of governments to pursue aggregate demand policy or fiscal 
policy, consistent with price stability and achieving external and internal balances, is 
often undermined in the face of large external shocks typically facing fragile low-
income countries. The aptitude of governments in providing public goods depends also 
on their revenue-raising capacity, which, in turn, is affected by exogenous events 
outside their control. Thus, what is assessed is often endogenous to growth, contrary to 
the claim that the criteria used in the CPIA are ‘in principle independent of growth 
outcomes’ (Collier and Dollar 2004: F255). At the same time, some scores are distinctly 
related to policy choice variables, as illustrated in rating score under trade policy, which 
is based mostly (75 per cent) on the ‘trade restrictiveness’ measured in terms of tariff 
and non-tariff barriers deployed.  
While many of the criteria used are not necessarily controversial in their own light and 
terms (e.g., those listed under policies for social inclusion/equity), it should also be 
recognized that the quality of institutions and the implemental capacity for 
socioeconomic policies, evaluated under the CPIA, are often a reflection of structural 
characteristics of low-income economies. Hence, they should be treated as a 
manifestation of their stage and level of economic development rather than that of 
societal subjective preferences or simple choice parameters of recipient governments. 
These structural characteristics should evolve and change as development proceeds. For 
example, all three dimensions, listed as criteria upon which financial sector policy is 
assessed (financial stability; the sector’s efficiency, depth, and resource mobilization 
strength; and access to financial services) are a function of the level and stage of 
economic development. The financial sector develops in tandem with the real sector 
activities as demand and supply for financial services interact dynamically over time 
(Nissanke and Aryeetey 1998; Nissanke 2004). 
Thus, the CPIA-based aid allocation formula cannot be seen as a fair rule, since it gives 
a common scoring for all countries with the equal weighting of the different factors, 
irrespective of the level of development and structural characteristics of each country.11 
Indeed, a closer evaluation of the criteria listed in the CPIA reveals that these scores 
overlap largely with those included in the extended policy conditionality list that the 
recipient governments had to comply in return for aid disbursements under the SAPs. 
The nature of policy conditionality remains largely intact. What has changed is the 
method of aid allocation mechanisms from ex ante conditionality to performance-based 
ex post conditionality. This is not surprising, since the CPIA is based on the premise 
that ‘the broad thrust of World Bank policy advice over the last two decades has been 
correct’ (Collier and Dollar 2004: F246).  
While concepts such as ownership and partnership are recognized and promoted as an 
important dimension for success in producing the desired development outcomes 
                                                 
11 With reference to his criticism of the CPIA, Kanbur (2005) also remarks that a common scoring for all 
countries is justified only if we endorse the assumption of ‘a common development model for all 
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through aid delivery, the selectivity rule- and performance-based aid allocation, as 
practiced today, is still an imposition of one particular development model by the donor 
community on recipient countries as an uniquely appropriate, universal model to be 
adopted by all development countries. From this perspective, the CPIA cannot be 
treated as truly performance-based parameters measured in terms of development 
outcomes, as claimed. It is instead a matrix contaminated with ‘intermediate variables’ 
that measure the extent to which a recipient accepts policy choice parameters as seen 
desired by donors (Kanbur 2005).  
Consequently, the aid relationships emerging under the ‘new aid architecture’ are far 
from ideal for making incentive structures efficient for neither donors nor recipient 
governments. Nor are they conducive to forging a genuine partnership between donors 
and recipients in their common efforts for building local institutions and capabilities to 
overcome the technical and financial constraints to sustainable development in the light 
of locally prevailing conditions and characteristics, i.e., in a country-specific context.  
3  The CPIA-based debt austainability analysis 
In early 2004, with the sunset of the HIPC Initiative approaching amidst widespread 
recognition about its limited achievements in providing a lasting exit to HIPCs’ debt 
problems, the IDA and IMF presented their new debt sustainability framework (DSF). A 
series of joint staff papers introduced the notion of policy-dependent debt thresholds, 
referring to a method according to which the indicative threshold values of a country’s 
external debt burden indicators are set in relation to the CPIA (IMF-IDA 2004a, 2004b, 
2005). With negotiations for the 14th replenishment of IDA financing well under way at 
the time of its release, the DSF proposal also included a strong lender focus, elaborating 
on the options for making debt sustainability considerations functional to the IDA 
lending process. Concomitant to the DSF papers, a series of IDA background papers 
further elaborated on the operational aspects for incorporating the proposed CPIA–debt 
burden thresholds nexus into a formula determining the grants share of the overall IDA 
country financing envelope (IDA 2004a, 2004b, 2005).  
We illustrate in Figure 1 how the DSF is linked to the IDA-14 aid allocation system. 
The box indicative debt burden thresholds relates to the central pillar of the DSF. 
Thresholds are expressed in terms of the ratios of net present value (NPV) of debt to 
exports, NPV debt/GDP and the debt service/exports. Classifying countries into poor, 
medium or strong quality in terms of their CPIA score (see Appendix Table A2), these 
analyses establish the upper limits of the debt burden ratios that each category of 
countries can sustain with a 75 per cent likelihood of not falling into debt distress at any 
given year. 
The traffic light system combines actual debt burdens and CPIA-dependent thresholds 
into a ranking of countries according to categories of distress risk. This is done by 
calculating the percentage distance of a country’s actual debt burden indicators from the 
indicative thresholds associated with its performance category.12 Against these 
thresholds, the grants/loan mix of IDA country allocation is determined: 100 per cent 
                                                 
12 These thresholds are set on empirical grounds that are identical to the DSF thresholds, but using 
different cut-offs in the CPIA classification, leading to a substantial downward revision.  
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for high-risk countries; 50 per cent for medium-risk; and zero per cent for low-risk 
countries (see Appendix Table A3). The last step of IDA allocation involves the 
application of an upfront discount of 20 per cent to the grant component, to address the 
incentive distortions implicit in this allocation mechanism. An important set-back arises 
from this discount in terms of the detraction of overall financial flows to a country with 
high risk, as we further argue below.  
Despite their significance as crisis predictors in WB/IMF empirics, countries’ 
vulnerability to external shocks is left out of the process of defining indicative 
thresholds.13 Therefore, the DSF features as its second pillar so-called forward-looking 
debt sustainability analysis (DSA) to assess debt burden indicators over time (20 years) 
and under alternative scenarios of key macroeconomic, fiscal and external debt factors 
determining debt dynamics. More specifically, the DSA includes scenarios that 
incorporate variations in the key macroeconomic variables affecting debt sustainability, 
and which occur with an average 25 per cent probability over a simulation period of ten 
years. This ex ante approach to dealing with ‘plausible shocks’ is operated by ‘bound 
tests’, simulating a two-year one-standard deviation from historical averages of key 
macroeconomic variables.14 Once available, IDA-14 envisages such DSA exercises to 
yield more dynamic country debt distress classifications, integrating the static traffic 
light system approach.  
By design, the two pillars of the DSF fail to account for exceptionally large and 
infrequent shocks, i.e., occurring with probability lower than 25 per cent. In recognition 
of this, as well as the historical importance of such type of shocks as a key determinant 
to debt distress, a recent World Bank (2005b) report presents several proposals for a 
contingent debt service facility. As their common feature, the proposed schemes entail 
debt service rescheduling according to some measure of a debtor nation’s capacity to 
pay.  
In a detailed assessment of the DSF and its main buildingblocks, Ferrarini (2007) points 
out a number of shortcomings. First, the empirical basis underlying the DSF is 
remarkably thin, relying exclusively on the empirical results reported in a preliminary 
World Bank working paper by Kraay and Nehru (2004), and the IMF replication of 
similar analysis (IMF-IDA 2004a). The approach adopted in these studies to predicting 
debt distress fails to capture earlier signals of illiquidity, which are a precursor to the 
occurrence of distress. Furthermore, the significance of CPIA in their specifications is 
driven by the omission of aid disbursement or volatility, which could have explained, 
appropriately lagged, a high portion of illiquidity and repayment problems. Finally, the 
proxies for shocks employed in both studies are grossly inadequate. Real GDP growth, 
used as an encompassing measure, is unsuitable for distinguishing between exogenous 
shocks and endogenous factors. Indeed, our empirical re-assessment of their empirical 
exercises demonstrates that the inclusion of the UN’s economic vulnerability index 
                                                 
13   More precisely, a cross-country average vulnerability to external shocks is considered insofar it is 
indirectly reflected in the indicative thresholds derived from probabilistic regressions including both 
CPIA and shock variables. However, the degree to which shocks are reflected by the indicative 
thresholds is marginal, and depends on the exact specification used in the empirical exercises 
determining the coefficient on CPIA. 
14  For a detailed description of the proposed DSA, see World Bank (2005) and IMF and IDA (2004a). 
For a technical review of debt sustainability assessment methods, see Ferrarini (2007).  
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(EVI), or alternative shock measures, undermines CPIA’s significance as a predictor of 
debt distress (Ferrarini 2007). This finding sheds serious doubts upon the central 
position assigned to CPIA score in the extant debt sustainability framework.  
Second, while the empirical analyses in the two studies show that both CPIA and shocks 
are significant predictors of debt distress, the DSF assigns the central role in 
determining sustainable thresholds to CPIA, not to shocks. Thereby, the DSF distorts 
aid allocation even further in favour of ‘high-performing’ countries, at the cost of 
foregoing the provision of effective protection against shock-induced illiquidity. In 
Figure 2 we highlight the centrality of the CPIA in the current IDA allocation and debt 
sustainability framework. 
In Figure 2, each box represents stylized elements of the DSF/IDA-14 framework, and 
the arrows indicate the direction of causal relationships between these elements, 
assuming away, for convenience, any multiple feedback effects. This shows how a 
country’s CPIA score determines the amount of IDA country allocation, and, together 
with the country’s debt burden indicators, the grant share it is deemed to be eligible for. 
For example, the lower a country’s CPIA ranking, the lower its relative share of aid 
within the IDA envelope, and the higher its risk classification. As a consequence, the 
overall volume of aid flow to the country is further reduced in proportion to the discount 
applied to the higher grant share established by the traffic light system. Hence, it can be 
argued that by trying to address longer-term debt stock solvency concerns through 
increased grant financing, the DSF/IDA-14 framework introduces a perverse liquidity 
effect, generating a debt distress condition in short term. In fact, with a 20 per cent 
upfront reduction in overall aid allocation, the DSF reduces current net IDA transfers to 
a country with a lower CPIA score by the amount equivalent to the grace period of IDA 
loans (10 years, typically). Ultimately, to the extent that it is illiquidity, rather than 
insolvency that determines a country’s debt sustainability, the CPIA focus of the DSF 
makes the latter to succumb to the prerogatives of the extant IDA allocation framework, 
at the cost of losing its effectiveness in dealing with low-income countries’ debt crisis. 
In contrast to CPIA, vulnerability to external shocks enters the DSF merely via the 
forecasting exercises constituting its second pillar, while being left out the core IDA 
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allocation process. The outer left box of Figure 2 illustrates the marginal weight 
assigned to vulnerability to shocks, which enters the DSF exclusively through the 
assessment of forecasted effects from simulated changes to the denominator variables of 
the debt burden indicators. Indeed, the DSF-IDA-14 has left the key ‘vulnerability’ 
component to future work on contingent instruments. Our simulations applied to a 
country-case study of Uganda reveals the overall ineffectiveness of the currently 
proposed schemes (Ferrarini 2007) because they are based on modulation indices that 
fail to distinguish appropriately exogenous from endogenous determinants of a 
country’s capacity to pay that is affected by the ‘state of nature’.  
The failure of the current framework to assign a more central role to vulnerability in 
guiding both the aid allocation and debt sustainability process remains largely 
unjustified. While the commodity issues were not featured in the early debate on the 
causes for the debt crisis inflicting commodity-dependent low-income countries 
(Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001), there is by now almost unanimous agreement—including 
the World Bank and IMF—that vulnerability to external shocks represents a major 
factor behind the low-income country debt crisis and the renewed accumulation of 
unsustainable external debt stocks despite the HIPC Initiatives. Demonstrating the depth 
of the ‘commodity’ crisis in the 1980s, Maizels (1992) convincingly reveals how the 
beginning of the debt crisis of poor countries in the late 1970s coincided exactly with 
that of the ‘conveniently forgotten’ commodity crisis.  
Drawing on Maizels’ empirical research and Krugman’s classical analysis on debt 
overhang and forgiveness (1988), we argued previously that a state-contingent debt 
contract is required as ex ante debt relief mechanism to deal with the debt crises facing 
commodity-dependent, low-income countries (Nissanke and Ferrarini 2001, 2004). 
More recently, Cohen, Jacquet and Reisen (2005) also argue that subsidized contingent 
loans are superior over outright grants in financing productive investment in countries 
facing high vulnerability to external shocks such as natural resource price volatility. 
Yet, donors have failed so far to devise an effective mechanism of protecting vulnerable 
countries against the negative impacts from external shocks on economic growth and 
debt sustainability.  
Insofar as vulnerability to shocks represents a key determinant of debt distress, any DSF 
that does not effectively translate vulnerability assessments into appropriate policy 
responses in terms of volume and timing of aid is bound to fail in providing a lasting 
solution to debt distress of low-income countries.  
4  Contingency mechanisms as incentive-compatible contracts  
As discussed above, both the CPIA-based aid allocation rule and the CPIA-based debt-
sustainability framework do not satisfy the conditions required for making aid really 
effective and debt truly sustainable as well as for improving donor-recipient 
relationships. The CPIA is not a truly performance-based, outcome-centred assessment. 
In reality, the selectivity applies at least partly on the basis of the policies implemented 
that donors deem appropriate. The CPIA-based selection in aid allocation and debt relief 
is at best an ‘eclectic mix’ of outcome-based selectivity and policy conditionality. Yet, 
the present system is seen and promoted as ‘programmatic policy-based lending 
offering a particularly promising way to reconcile the debate between the traditional ex  
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ante approach and the aspirations of a results-based approach to conditionality’ (World 
Bank 2005c: 20).  
In reality, the current system of aid allocation and debt sustainability framework leaves 
many critical issues unresolved. First, policy-related selectivity criteria continue to be 
set by donors. This mechanism would surely undermine the ‘ownership’ of policies and 
reform programmes, as recipient governments in the need for foreign aid and debt relief 
would have strong incentives to opt for policies prescribed by donors rather than 
alternative policies they might have chosen otherwise. Second, the mechanical 
‘programmatic’ application of the selectivity rule is problematic, since the relationships 
between the quality of policies and institutions on one hand, and developmental 
outcomes on other, are much more tenuous in a short-term framework than implicitly 
assumed under the current framework. It often takes considerable lead time for changes 
in policies and institutions to produce tangible results in development indicators, 
including poverty indicators. Third, the performance-based system could heavily 
penalize fragile low-income countries which are more exposed to exogenous shocks, 
since their performances are more likely to be influenced by many factors beyond the 
control of governments, such as terms of trade shocks or climate-related conditions.  
Critically, the new selectivity approach fails to offer incentive-compatible, state-
contingent aid contracts which would allow an automatic access to contingency 
financing when recipient countries are hit by adverse unforeseen events. In our view, it 
is critically important to establish genuinely flexible, state-contingent  aid and debt 
contracts in order to align incentives of borrowers/recipients and lenders/donors. As 
Krugman (1988) notes, the trade-off between debt forgiveness and financing in a typical 
negotiation can be improved by indexing repayment to the ‘state of nature’. This is 
because the state-contingent schemes could make a distinction between the 
consequences of a debtor’s own efforts and events beyond its control. 
In reality, in the absence of efficient state-contingent contracts and without due attention 
to critical unresolved issues in the performance-based system, the aid relationships as 
emerged today under the selectivity rule are still predominantly characterized by donors 
taking very short-leash approach with intensive monitoring. Aid is disbursed in small 
tranches with the use of performance indicators as monitoring device to measure 
progress. For example, the European Union adopted performance-based conditionality 
at least partially in 28 budgetary aid programmes in 2001 and introduced a ‘variable 
financing tranche’ as a part of financing conventions with ACP countries (Africa, the 
Caribbean and Pacific) (Adam et al. 2004a). These authors observe that while this mode 
may have promoted a ‘culture of results’, it has not succeeded in shifting responsibility 
for policy formulation to recipient countries (ibid.).  
In a more detailed study of Uganda, where foreign aid has finance about a half of 
government expenditure over the recent decade, Adam and Gunning (2002) argue that 
the use of sector-specific detailed performance indicators, chosen jointly by the 
government and the EU, has changed donor-recipient relations with beneficial effect. 
However, they note several difficulties encountered, not only in deciding on genuine 
outcome indicators and verifying them, but also in dealing with the tension between the 
monitoring and incentive functions of performance indicators. In the end, the donors 
had to rely on short-run critical process undertaking, and to lock into micro-
management, based around a large number of input or process indicators, which were 
discredited under traditional ex ante conditionality. This inevitably undermined genuine  
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programme ownership and narrowed the space for effective policy debate. Furthermore, 
it is clearly acknowledged that the weak and uncertain link between inputs (i.e., efforts 
undertaken by a recipient) and outcome indicators, upon which aid disbursement is 
based, makes it difficult incentive structures to work in aid contracts.  
There is clearly a critical gap between the rhetoric and the practice under the new aid 
architecture. The performance-based aid disbursements requiring close monitoring on 
the part of donors could easily result in a high volatility in aid flows and severe 
disruptions to the development process in low-income recipient countries, whose aid 
dependence is overwhelming. Despite the claim that greater ownership and partnership 
have been achieved under the new aid architecture, the donor-recipient relationships are 
still built on shaky ground, where recipient governments and donors tend to position 
themselves in an ‘aid power’ game, which could result in an inferior non-cooperative 
equilibrium.  
Furthermore, certain presumptions incorporated in the principal-agent framework 
should be critically re-evaluated in its application to the analysis of aid relationships. 
For example, recipient governments are often assumed to change their behaviour only 
for getting more aid in future, as if they do not have a stake in enhancing the welfare of 
their domestic agents. It is not unusual to start discussion with the assumption that 
donors are always benevolent, and development-minded, acting on pure altruism, while 
recipient governments are seen as untrustworthy towards the international agencies as 
well as predatory towards domestic agents, using re-distributional fiscal instruments 
largely for political and personal gains. This assumption is not only too restrictive for 
the model to be of general use as an analytical tool, but also not reflective of the reality 
in which aid relationships should be contextualized in much more wider, complex 
international political and economic relations. It is true that some recipient governments 
with politically narrow-based regimes may well behave in a predatory manner towards 
domestic agents. However, this would not justify the assumption that all recipient 
governments are characterized by such attributes. 
In our view, there is an urgent need to make aid and debt contracts incentive compatible 
by providing contingent financing facility to low-income countries which are often 
susceptible to large exogenous shocks. The recent debate on grants-versus-loans has 
been triggered by the desire on the part of some donors to eliminate the recurrent 
problems of debt overhang by providing official development aid (ODA) in outright 
grants only.15 However, as Cohen, Jacquet and Reisen (2005) note, such a debate is 
somewhat misleading and largely irrelevant if we can properly address the key issues of 
maintaining debt sustainability of these low-income countries.  
In Figure 3, we outline a contingency debt sustainability framework (CDSF) as 
alternative to the current framework discussed above.16  
 
                                                 
15  See Odedukun (2004), Bulow and Rogoff (2005), Nunnemkamp et al. (2005), and Cohen, Jacquet and 
Reisen (2005) for detailed discussion on the grants-versus-loans debate.  
16 The CDSF is a shortened and modified extract from Ferrarini (2007), where a more comprehensive 
description of the CDSF and its main implications on aid allocation and debt sustainability is 
presented.  
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4.1  Endogenous versus exogenous balance-of-payments determinants  
The central feature of the CDSF lies in the distinction between factors affecting a debtor 
country’s balance of payments (BOP). By applying a specifically devised accounting 
methodology, on the basis of consolidated BOP data at the end of each period t, a 
crucial distinction is drawn between factors of exogenous and endogenous nature. The 
former are defined as being beyond the power of influence of a debtor country, such as 
world demand and prices, while the latter are at least in part, or potentially, subject to 
the country’s control. 
The lower left-side of Figure 3 shows a further disaggregating of exogenous factors into 
trend and shock components. While both components are externally determined 
variables insofar as they lie outside the country’s influence, trend effects are assumed to 
be internalized in the country’s expectations regarding future BOP realizations, while 
shocks are not. That is, the country is assumed to formulate its macroeconomic 
configurations according to trend expectations, thereby internalizing historical trends of 
exogenous BOP effects in its policy decisions. For example, the amounts produced and 
exported of a particular crop may be adjusted as a deliberate policy choice in the face of 
an observable price trend. Therefore, export earnings from that particular crop are 
exogenous only with regard to the actual price trend and the effects from natural factors 
on yields, but not with regard to volume adjustments made in response to those external 
forces. Exogenous shocks, in contrast, are defined as random realizations around trend 
and are, as such, unforeseeable. It will be argued below, in relation to the CDSF 
performance assessment, that it is crucial for such a distinction to be made in the context 
of a contingency scheme, for the latter not to distort incentives for low-income countries 
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The upper left-side box of Chart 3 represents all non-exogenous determinants of the 
balance of payments. These include endogenous factors, which are deemed to be in the 
domain of policies adopted by recipient governments, as well as all the BOP effects 
resulting from complex interrelations between external shocks and policy reactions to 
the latter. We call the latter mixed, or indeterminate, effects. The multitude of 
interactions between external factors and internal policy measures makes it difficult to 
identify clear-cut causal relationships, or to disentangle and measure the single forces 
constituting mixed effects. Despite the difficulties implicit in any such identification 
exercise, the accounting methodology underlying the CDSF allows for a sufficiently 
accurate ex post extrapolation of all the balance-of-payments determinants that can be 
clearly qualified as exogenous price shocks or trend factors, on the basis of consolidated 
data observable by both the borrower and the lenders at the end of period t.17 To the 
contrary, all the other BOP effects, whether endogenous or mixed, are dealt with as a 
residual within the CDSF framework. 
4.2  The contingent credit line 
The contingent credit line constitutes the CDSF instrument to adjust a low-income 
country’s BOP cashflow in response to exogenous shocks, by modulating net official 
transfers. Upon identification and measurement of the realized effects of shocks on a 
debtor country’s balance of payments, the contingency mechanism involves the 
automatic disbursement or amortization of interest-free top-up funds in proportion to 
their net overall direction and magnitude. In order to be effective in filling the liquidity 
gap ensuing from negative shocks, such disbursements are to occur periodically, at the 
end of period t, or with higher frequency, depending on the feasibility to conduct an 
immediate impact assessment. By definition, shocks are identified as random events 
around trend and should, as such, be mean-reverting. Hence, there may not be a prior 
justification for the contingency mechanism to disburse grants, instead of credits. 
Nevertheless, the scheme should be made flexible to include periodical grant-
conversions of debts accumulated by the credit line, to the extent that the cumulative 
effects from these events over the longer term should not revert to trend, or should have 
resulted from large real shocks such as natural disasters.18  
4.3  Performance assessment against contractual obligations 
The upper central box of Figure 3 represents the central mechanism of the CDSF in 
relation to the treatment of non-shock factors determining a country’s balance of 
payments during t. According to the above definition, both exogenous trend and mixed 
endogenous components are at least in principle amenable by the effect of deliberate 
policy choices. Therefore, a compensatory mechanism that were to extend the treatment 
accorded to fully exogenous shocks to these factors would introduce a potential for 
incentive distortions affecting a recipient’s efforts aimed at consolidating its 
                                                 
17 The ex  post nature of the CDSF assessment is not to be confused with the ex-ante nature of its 
compensatory function. 
18  It is assumed that real volume shocks due to natural disasters are unlikely to be offset by positive real 
shocks. Of course, the events referred to are related to the exceptional occurrence of disasters with 
significant impact.  
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balance-of-payments position over time. We thus envisage the CDSF to include a 
domestic policy performance assessment against pre-defined country-specific 
benchmarks. The latter should be set in relation to each period t and define a detailed 
country policy agenda, in lieu of an underlying contract between the country authorities 
and the donor community.19  
At the end of each period t, the CDSF assesses a country’s compliance with regard to 
the actual enactment of policies and actions agreed upon for that period, but not on the 
basis of their outcomes. To the extent that domestic policy implementation relates to 
observable actions such as decrees and laws, the CDSF thereby avoids the identification 
problem of policy effects and sets the pre-condition for the scheme to operate on an 
ex ante basis, i.e., regulated by the terms set out in the underlying contract. That is, in 
contrast to many on-going policy assessment exercises such as IMF’s PRGF review, 
which makes periodical disbursements of IMF credit-tranches conditional upon a 
recipient country meeting quantitative performance criteria and benchmarks relating to 
policy results, we propose that the CDSF assert a country’s qualification for continued 
support on the basis of policy-enactment alone. Therefore, the CDSF would ensure a 
performance assessment to be made independent of exogenous factors affecting 
outcomes, and borrowers to be unduly held accountable for neither exogenous factors 
nor the actual development effectiveness of agreed-upon policies. At the same time, the 
CDSF performance assessment should be made in a manner to control for a recipient’s 
moral hazard implications by effectively providing the donor community with the 
enforcement instrument necessary to hold countries accountable for their policy 
commitments. 
Performance assessment has different implications with regard to various components 
of the CDSF, not all of which can be addressed here. In relation to both the category of 
mixed-endogenous and trend BOP factors, the performance assessment ascertains a 
LIC’s fulfilment of conditions laid out for the period t, as one input informing the 
lenders’ decision concerning the volume of aid allocation in period t+1. Such decision 
would ultimately have to rely on a broad assessment of LIC’s specific needs for official 
development assistance, with a particular focus on requirements arising out of its fiscal 
performances as well as ongoing and planned development projects supported by 
foreign aid. However, the performance assessment envisaged in the CDSF would be 
very different from the one conducted as part of the CPIA-based allocation process, 
where a particular set of policies selected by the donor community is deemed uniquely 
appropriate and universally applicable to all development countries.  
4.4  The debt relief mechanism 
Only with regard to the category of BOP trend factors has the CDSF performance 
assessment ex ante implications on the grant share of aid allocation in period t. As 
discussed above, BOP trend factors are identified as originating from conditions 
exogenous to the country, but whose magnitude is susceptible to change effected by 
deliberate policy reactions. By classifying policy actions according to their contractual 
                                                 
19 The contract should be an expression of a genuinely cooperative approach between the parties to the 
contract. It would also be able to overcome the coordination problems affecting the donor community 
in setting often conflicting policy prerogatives.  
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legitimacy, the performance assessment validates the component of trend factors that is 
(potentially) under government control. Hence, to the extent that a LIC is found in 
compliance with policy obligations, the CDSF can provide a distinct treatment to the 
category of trend effects, and yet avoid introducing incentive distortions. More 
specifically, we envisage the CDSF to incorporate an automatic conversion of an 
official credit flow equal to the adverse trend factors during period t into grants, i.e., to 
relief. The rationale for such a debt relief operation is that LICs typically face negative 
trend factors—most notably in form of deteriorating terms of trade—as a reflection of 
underlying structural deficiencies, which cannot be overcome in the short and medium 
term by domestic policy alone. To the extent that such trend factors heavily bear on 
LICs need for official development assistance, the achievement of debt sustainability 
requires the latter not to be contributing towards the increased build-up of external debt, 
and be relieved instead. 
By according ex  ante debt relief to a country’s observed degree of exposure to 
exogenous trend factors, the CDSF can be seen in a sharp contrast to the IFI-DSF. For, 
the latter pre-determines a country’s grant share according to the perceived risk of debt 
distress, and thus lacks the necessary flexibility to adjust the grant share of ODA to 
actual circumstances affecting a debtor’s balance of payments. However, to the extent 
that the debt distress forecasts within the IFI-DSF only poorly reflect the actual BOP 
implications of unfavourable trends, which could have a significant bearing on a 
debtor’s overall risk of distress, the CDSF approach to ex  ante debt relief should 
constitute an essential component towards averting the emergence of debt distress 
situations. 
4.5  Debt sustainability analysis 
Lenders’ willingness to roll over existing debt and to supply fresh credits is informed by 
their own perceptions regarding a debtor’s capacity to carry debt. In this sense, the 
debtor’s payment capacity, to a large measure, depends on the lenders’ perceptions and 
actions. That is, a country’s debt will be sustainable as long as lenders consider it to be 
so in their assessment and show the willingness to enact the necessary lending decisions 
and overcome the coordination problems among themselves.20 Thus, the CDSF debt 
sustainability analysis would have to depart on several grounds from the DSA as 
currently conducted within the IFI-DSF. 
The IFI-DSF crucially relies on average CPIA-based debt indicators to pre-determine 
the aid allocation and grant share in any period t, as well as to assess the country’s debt 
sustainability prospects in the face of changing circumstances during subsequent 
periods. Lacking any contingency mechanism, a LIC’s debt sustainability assessment 
thus results from estimated changes in future debt ratios against benchmarks. In 
contrast, the CDSF operates a country-specific contingent adjustment to the amount and 
composition of aid flows in any period t, which not only precludes any cross-country 
benchmark assessment, but also relegates the debt sustainability concerns to a projection 
of the future debt emanating from those factors that are not dealt with by the 
contingency mechanisms.  
                                                 
20  Such a self-fulfilling characteristic of lenders’ attitude towards a borrower’s sustainability is described 
in Ferrarini (2007).  
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Consequently, Figure 3 shows the debt sustainability assessment exercise to be located 
outside the narrow context of the contingency assessment and compensation mechanism 
of the CDSF. Instead, under the CDSF regime, debt sustainability concerns will be 
internalized in the lending decisions relating to future periods t+1, in relation to the 
estimated debt flow and stock effects resulting from endogenous and mixed BOP 
effects. The pre-determined volume and grant mix of aid allocation relating to period 
t+1 will therefore be the result of the lender community’s discretionary decision process 
involving the combined assessment of needs, sustainability and policy performance 
relating to a specific country. The debt sustainability assessment exercise highlights a 
particular need for specific amendments of the CDSF contract’s terms of coverage 
during future periods of application. It would emerge as an outcome of negotiations 
between the donor community and the borrowing country. We also propose estimates of 
contingent debt ratios to be free from the use of arbitrary net present value calculations 
as practised by IFIs so far.  
5 Concluding  remarks 
Aid effectiveness is known to rest critically on the nature of recipient-donor 
relationships as well as on trained and experienced staff and efficient aid channelling 
procedures. The non-compliance of traditional ex ante conditionality can be explained 
by the development of unfortunate aid relationships in which policy conditionality was 
dictated by the donor community. Clearly, the issue of aid effectiveness or aid 
dependence and debt sustainability cannot be effectively analysed and debated without 
reference to the unequal aid relationships. Equally, the appropriateness of economic 
policies and political institutions cannot be judged or assessed in isolation from 
prevailing country-specific conditions. While blame for the policy failure has been 
placed too readily on recipient governments and institutions in terms of poor policy 
environments and their incapacity, the donor community has to take a fair share of 
responsibility for the poor relationships that have evolved over the last few decades.  
In many cases, policy reforms were forced upon recipient countries under the SAPs as 
stringent conditions in return for debt relief and foreign aid. Recipient governments 
often found it impossible to implement these policies in their domestic political 
economy context, as they were certain to generate a sharp configuration of winners and 
losers. The timeframe for implementation was often unrealistic. These reform packages 
were sometimes so contentious that donor governments themselves would have found 
them hard to implement or to sell to their own domestic constituencies. Thus, the donor-
recipient relationships have been severely impaired by the two-decade long experiences 
with policy conditionality, whereby a series of restrictive policy conditionality was 
imposed as a universally applicable basis for reforms. Yet, the conventional way of 
debating the effectiveness and enforcement problems of policy conditionality has been 
inhibiting, for it has hardly departed from the assumption that policy reforms 
recommended by donors are generally appropriate for dealing with economic problems 
facing developing economies.  
The weaknesses associated with the past practice of policy conditionality have been 
debated and the new emerging aid architecture is supposed to address these issues. As 
the debate on aid effectiveness and conditionality has evolved and unfolded, the need 
for forging effective partnerships between the donor community and the government  
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and the civil society of recipient countries has increasing been recognized as one of 
conditions for increasing aid effectiveness and the ownership of aid programmes by the 
recipient countries. 
However, in many low-income countries, it has not been easy to work towards a new 
aid relationship based on a genuine partnership and ownership of policy reforms. 
Instead of providing aid for enhancing recipients’ efforts in building an institutional 
foundation with the necessary technical capacity for developing their own ‘home-
grown’ strategies and policies, donors continue to police over whether recipient 
governments adopt, and adhere to, economic policies and institutional governance 
structures recommended by donors.  
Yet, unless a uncompromised ‘policy space’ is accorded to recipient countries in setting 
their own development agenda and policy strategy, the real ownership of economic 
reform programmes cannot be bestowed in the hands of recipient countries. The lack of 
sense of ownership and partnership could propagate and promote a ‘cheating’ behaviour 
on the part of the agents-recipients. Rather than impose monolithic models, there should 
be a room for open discussions and debate on different development models. In this 
context, Morrissey (2004) emphasizes the importance of allowing a process of policy 
learning and policy experimentation and leaving the policy choices to recipient 
governments for the sake of establishing ownership as well as encouraging partnership. 
Donors should play the role of ‘second fiddle’ in this policymaking process, providing 
technical assistance and information services.   
There should also be policy space for institutional innovations. In this context, Rodrik 
(2004) argues that ‘effective institutional outcomes do not map into unique institutional 
designs’ and that: 
there is no unique, non-context specific way of achieving desirable institutional 
outcomes. Since what works will depend on local constraints and 
opportunities, we should bear in mind that institutional prescriptions should be 
contingent on the prevailing characteristics of the local economy and that 
institutional design has to be context-specific (Rodrik 2004: 9). 
What is urgently required is mutual respect so that the two parties could fully and truly 
engage in learning from each others’ development experiences, taking into account their 
different historical and cultural backgrounds. Recipient governments are increasingly 
demanded to be accountable to the donor community. This by itself may not pose a 
problem, but high pressures from donors on important policy matters could place 
recipient governments in conflict with the responsibility towards their own citizens. 
Such situations can easily undermine the democratic credentials of recipient 
governments. It is a high time to depart from unproductive aid relationships and to work 
towards cultivating mutual trust and respect, conducive to producing positive global 
public goods, sustainable economic development and enduring political stability in 
recipient countries.  
On reflection, it can be said that the aid effectiveness debate conducted mainly at the 
aggregate macro-relationships may not shed real insight on how to make foreign aid 
effective for economic growth and poverty reduction. Remarking that aid is given for 
many different purposes and in many different forms, Hansen and Tarp (2001a, 2001b) 
suggest that the unresolved issue in assessing aid effectiveness is not whether aid works,  
  21
but how and whether we can make the different kinds of aid instruments at hand work 
better in varying country circumstances.  
Assessed from these critical perspectives, the CPIA-based selectivity rule is certainly 
not an ideal base to conduct meaningful policy dialogue between donors and recipients. 
The allocation process is a mechanical application of the index which is a mix of ranked 
policy and institutional parameters as well as outcomes. Indeed, in the prevailing 
economic analysis of the ex post conditionality game, there is little discussion on how to 
build and develop information endowments based on confidence and mutual trust in the 
donor-recipient relationships. Yet, in the game theory, sufficient and continuous 
information flows between the parties are accepted as one of critical conditions for 
reaching a superior cooperative equilibrium with an efficient mechanism for conflict 
resolution.  
Further, it is also well-known that in intertemporal resource transactions, a coherent 
incentive-compatible aid-debt contract is necessary to ensure an alignment of the 
incentive structures governing the aid relationships. Hence, the absence of an 
unconditional contingent financing facility available upon verification of large 
exogenous shocks to recipient countries should be seen as one of binding constraints for 
improving aid relationships. 
In this paper, we outlined an alternative scheme of contingency debt financing facility 
and aid allocation. The proposed scheme is predicated on new aid relationships where 
the process of policy learning and experimentation as well as institutional 
experimentation and innovation is genuinely encouraged and a sense of true ownership 
and partnership is restored and prevailed. The performance assessments could then be 
made in the environment conducive to nurturing mutual trust and respect on the basis of 
transparent and free flows of information between donors and recipients.  
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Appendix 
Appendix Table A1 
2004 Criteria included in CPIA 
 
A. Economic management 
 1.  Macroeconomic  management 
  2.   Fiscal policy 
  3.   Debt policy 
B. Structural policies  
  4.   Trade  
  5.   Financial sector  
  6.   Business regulatory environment  
C. Policies for social inclusion/equity 
  7.   Gender equality 
  8.   Equity of public resource use 
  9.   Building human resources 
  10.   Social protection and labour 
  11.  Policies and institutions for environmental sustainability 
D. Public sector management and institutions 
  12.   Property rights and rule-based governance 
  13.   Quality of budgetary and financial management 
  14.   Efficiency of revenue mobilization 
  15.  Quality of public administration 
  16.   Transparency, accountability, and corruption in the public sector 
Source:   World Bank (2005a: Annex: 2). 
 
Appendix Table A2 
CPIA-Dependent debt burden thresholds (DSF versus IDA-14) 
DSF thresholds (/1)  IDA-14 thresholds (/2) 
  Thresholds of debt burden 
indicators 














             
Poor 30  100  15    CPIA≤ 3.25  30 100  15 
Medium    45 200  25    3.25<CPIA<3.75  40 150  20 
Strong 60  300  35    3.75≤ CPIA  50 200  25 
Notes:   NPV EDT = net present value of publicly and publicly guaranteed external debt (US dollars); 
  XGS = exports of goods and services (US dollars); 
  (/1)  Categories defined along the 25th and 75th percentiles of the CPIA index. Source: IDA-IMF 
(2004: 21) 
  (/2)  Categories defined under new cut-offs. Source: IDA (2004a). 




Appendix Table A3 
Traffic light system determining the share of grant financing 
Actual debt burden minus threshold (/1), %  Traffic light/risk of distress  Share of grant financing, %
    
> 10     Red (high risk)  100 
< +/- 10    Yellow (moderate risk)  50 
< 10     Green (low risk)  0 
Note:    (/1) Computed as the larger distance among the average of the relative distances of NPV 
EDT/GDP and NPV EDT/XGS and the proportional distance of the TDS/XGS indicator. 
 
 
 
 
 
 